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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the State introduced sufficient evidence at

trial to support the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of
committing a second degree felony theft in Utah.
2.

Whether the defendant can raise the issue of the

propriety of Jury Instruction 14 for the first time on appeal.
3.

Whether Jury Instruction 14 regarding possession of

recently stolen property was constitutionally defective.

ill

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 870385-CA

vs.
( P r i o r i t y No. 2 )

CHARLES EDWARD MASSEY,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Respondent
Statement of the Case
The defendant was charged with Burglary of a Dwelling, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 766-202 (1953, as amended), and with Theft of Property exceeding
$1000 in value, also a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953, as amended), both crimes
alleged to have occurred on or about March 22-24, 1987, in West
Point, County of Davis, State of Utah.

In a jury trial held July

15, 1987, with the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge,
presiding, the defendant was found not guilty of the burglary
charge and guilty of the theft charge.
At the conclusion of the State's evidence at trial, the
defendant moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-1-201, claiming that the State had failed to present
evidence that the theft had occurred within the State of Utah and
that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction.

This motion

was denied.

Subsequent to the trial and prior to sentencing, the

defendant moved the trial court to arrest judgment and to set
aside the jury's verdict of guilty on the theft charge, again
claiming a lack of jurisdiction under Section 76-1-201. These
motions were denied on August 11, 1987, and on that date the
defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term of 1-15 years, to pay a fine of $5,000.00 plus
a surcharge of $1,250.00, and to pay restitution to Lee Thompson
in the amount of $28,180.00.
Statement of the Facts
In the early part of March, 1987, Norma Thompson
underwent a serious knee surgery.

Because the surgery was

temporarily incapacitating, and because Norma's husband, Lee
Thompson, was also in poor health, the two of them stayed with
their daughter, Kathleen Massey (aka Kathy Huff) in her residence
in Ogden.

(T. 11, 24, 66-67)

The defendant, Charles Massey,

lived at the Ogden address with Kathleen, as her common-law
husband.

Also living at the Ogden residence were Shelly Powell,

Kathleen's daughter, and John Dobson, a friend of the defendant.
(T. 23, 63, 72, 81-82)
While staying with Kathleen, the Thompsons had left
their usual residence, a house at 3510 West 1300 North, in West
Point, vacant.
Dennis Bingham.

They were renting this house from Norma's son,
Most of the Thompsons' personal belongings and

valuables remained at the house in West Point.

Cheryl Lynn,

another daughter of Norma, checked up on the West Point house
regularly and picked up the mail daily.
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(T. 11, 18, 23)

On March 24, 1987, the defendant and his friend, John
Dobson, left the Ogden residence sometime between 2:00 and 3:00
p.m. to go get a part for a broken grinder.
(T. 63-64, 70-71)

They never returned.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. the same day,

Dennis Bingham went to the Thompsons' residence in West Point to
feed a goat he kept in the back pasture, and discovered that the
house had been broken into.

(T. 11-12)

worth of property had been removed.

More than $20,000.00

(T. 25-51, 61)

Dennis Bingham called the police, and Davis County
Sheriff's deputies processed the scene, finding two yellowhandled screwdrivers in the house.

One was found on the TV stand

from which a VCR had been removed during the burglary, and the
other was found on the floor of a back bedroom next to a filing
cabinet that had been pried open.

(T. 76-78, 101-103)

Both were

later identified by Shelly Powell as belonging to the defendant,
by means of red paint markings on each, as Shelly had watched the
defendant paint his car a red primer color sometime before the
burglary.

(T. 82-84)

At trial, Shelly produced and identified, for the first
time, two additional yellow-handled screwdrivers, also with red
paint markings.

(T. 85-86)

She stated that all four

screwdrivers had belonged to the defendant (T. 86), but that she
now recalled that the defendant had given the two screwdrivers
found at the scene of the burglary to a person called Sonny Terry
prior to the burglary.

(T. 86-87, 90)

She stated that she had

not remembered that fact when she first talked to the police, and
had only been reminded of it about a month prior to trial when
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she saw the two "new" screwdrivers in the trunk of the
defendant's car.

(T. 90-92)

Carl Terry ("Sonny") testified that the defendant had
never given him any screwdrivers, although he was aware that the
defendant had put red primer paint on two separate cars, similar
to the paint on the two screwdrivers.

He also testified that he

did not burglarize Lee Thompson's house.

(T. 95-97)

Based on the identification of the two screwdrivers
found at the scene, and the simultaneous disappearance of the
defendant and the property from the house, a warrant was issued
for his arrest.

Four days later, on March 28, 1987, the

defendant was stopped for speeding near Bend, Oregon, by Oregon
State Police Officer Ken Hodson.

John Dobson was the sole

passenger in the vehicle with the defendant.

It was the same

vehicle, a red and white Monte Carlo, registered to the
defendant, in which the defendant and Dobson had left Utah a few
days earlier.

(T. 105-106, 150)

Hodson arrested the defendant

on the Utah warrant, and with the defendant's consent, searched
the vehicle, seized some items, and impounded it.

Two days

later, after speaking with the Utah Sheriff's detective, Hodson
again searched the vehicle with the defendant's consent, and
discovered more items.

(T. 108-118)

Officer Hodson discovered the following items in the
locations indicated:
1.

A Franklin Mint Mailer tube addressed to Lee

Thompson, found in open view in the trunk of defendant's vehicle
(T. 108-109), which had been locked in a black suitcase or
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footlocker stolen from a basement shelf in Thompson's home.

(T.

42)
2.

A string necktie or bolo tie, found in the pocket of

a blue down coat in the back seat of the Monte Carlo, (T. 110112) which had been taken from a white box on Lee Thompson's
dresser.

(T. 41)

The defendant told Officer Hodson that the

blue coat was his, and also claimed that he owned the string tie.
(T. Ill, 125)
3.

A bead bracelet or necklace with earrings, found in

the opposite pocket of the blue down coat (T. 112), which had
been taken from the pried-open filing cabinet in the Thompson
home.

(T. 68-69)
4.

A baggie full of various old as well as current

coins and tokens found in the defendant's pants pocket (T.
118), which had been in a green footlocker in the Thompson's
basement.
5.

(T. 44-48)
A plastic Safeway shopping bag found concealed

under the floor carpet of the trunk of the Monte Carlo in a
fender well or wheel well (T. 116-118), which contained old
watches (one of which had been Lee Thompson's grandfather's
watch), a small pure silver token which had travelled around the
noon in one of the Apollo flights, and which was itself worth
more than $1,000.00; these items had been in the green and the
black footlocker taken from the basement.
6.

(T. 50-51)

A baggie full of guarters and an envelope with Lee

Thompson's handwriting on it, also found in the wheel well; these
items had also been stolen from the Thompson home.
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(T. 48-49,

119-120)
Most of the items stolen from the Thompson home were
never recovered (T. 60-61), although the defendant did have in
excess of $900.00 in large bills on his person when arrested in
Oregon, which money he had not had when he left Utah.

(T. 126-

127, 152-153)
Summary of The Argument
1.

There was an abundance of evidence supporting the

jury verdict that the defendant committed the crime of theft in
Utah.
2.

The defendant did not object to the giving of Jury

Instruction No. 14, and cannot raise the issue for the first time
on appeal.
3.

The Jury Instruction regarding possession of

recently stolen property is a correct statement of the law and is
constitutionally sound.
Argument
POINT I
THE RECORD CONTAINS AMPLE EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED A
SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT IN UTAH.
It is undisputed that, in order for a Utah court to have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a criminal offense, the
evidence must show that at least part of the crime occurred in
Utah.

The applicable Utah Code provision, Section 76-1-201

provides, in pertinent part;
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in
this state for an offense which he commits,
while either within or outside the state, by
his own conduct or that of another for which
6

he is legally accountable if:
a) The offense is committed either wholly or
partly within the state;
*

*

*

(2) An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which
is such an element, occurs within this
state.•..
This Court has adopted the following standard of review
when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard for determining sufficiency of
the evidence is that the evidence be "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe
defendant had committed a crime." State v.
Romero. 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In
determining whether evidence is sufficient,
the Court will review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161,
1168 (Utah 1980). Unless there is a clear
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict
will be upheld. State v. Logan. 563 P.2d
811, 814 (Utah 1977).
State v. Gabaldon. 735 P.2d 410 (Ct. App. April 15, 1987).

As

noted in State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985):
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." State
V. Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);
accord State v. Linden. Utah, 657 P.2d 1364,
1366 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.
Id. at 345 (citation omitted).

And, even if the Court views the

evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be
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upheld.

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

In short,

"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the
version of the facts which supports the verdict."

State v.

Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Howell.
649 P.2d at 93).

See also. State v. Moncada. No. 860243-CA (Ut.

Ct. App. May 13, 1987).
In reviewing the record of the evidence presented in the
present case "in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,"
it becomes clear that there was ample evidence, both to support
the jury finding that the defendant committed a second degree
felony theft, and to support the finding that at least one, if
not all of the elements of that theft occurred in Utah.
It was never disputed that Lee and Norma Thompson had
more than $20,000.00 worth of their personal property taken from
their home in West Point.

It was also not disputed that no one

had permission to take that property, nor did the defendant, in
his statement to Officer Hodson, ever claim to have had
permission to take any of the property from the Thompsons.

It

was further not disputed that the defendant was caught in
possession of more than $1,000.00 worth of that property on a
freeway near Bend, Oregon, four days after he and the property
had initially disappeared.

Some of the property was in the

defendant's pants pocket, some was in each of two pockets of his
coat in the back seat of his car, some was in plain view in the
trunk of his car, and some was hidden in the trunk of his car.
The defendant claims, however, that "[T]here is
absolutely no evidence to show that Mr. Massey committed a theft
8

in Utah and/or obtained or exercised unauthorized control over
the stolen property while in Utah."

(Appellant's Brief, p.4)

Such an assertion simply ignores the evidence in the record.
Each of the following points of evidence presented to the jury
indicate that the defendant stole the property while in Utah:
1.

The fact that the two screwdrivers belonging to the

defendant were left in the victim's home and had apparently been
used in obtaining the property.

It is true that Shelly Powell

claimed that the defendant had given these two screwdrivers to
"Sonny" Terry prior to the burglary.

However, Sonny Terry

testified that that was not true, and that the defendant had
never given Sonny any screwdrivers.

The jury was free to believe

whom they chose and, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in
Booker above, an appellate court may not and cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of one
witness against another.
2.

The defendant apparently knew the location in the

victim's home from which some of the stolen property was taken.
When questioned by Officer Hodson about fingerprints, the
defendant not only stated that his own fingerprints would be all
over the house, but specifically mentioned that his fingerprints
would be on "the file cabinet."

(T. 125)

Only someone who had

been at the filing cabinet and taken property from it would have
any reason to believe that the police would have cause to lift
fingerprints from such a specific location.

Not surprisingly, it

was the filing cabinet from which several of the stolen items
were taken, and it was the filing cabinet that had been pried
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open with the defendant's screwdriver.
3.

The defendant and the stolen property disappeared

simultaneously.

Furthermore, the defendant's disappearance from

Utah was not a scheduled trip, or anything he talked about or
mentioned in advance.

He and his friend Dobson simply drove

away, supposedly to get a grinder fixed, and vanished.
4.

Both the defendant and the stolen property were

found in Oregon in the same vehicle in which the defendant left
Utah.

The defendant owned that vehicle and was the driver.

None

of the stolen property was found on the person or among the
belongings of Dobson, the sole passenger.
5.

The defendant was specifically asked by Officer

Hodson as to how he had obtained possession of each of the groups
of stolen items.

The defendant's explanations did not include

any claim that he acquired any of the items at any location
outside the State of Utah.

(T. 123-124)

Nor can one imagine any

reasonable scenario explaining how the defendant could have
acquired any of the stolen items outside of Utah, during the four
days he and Dobson were travelling up and down the west coast.
6.

While there was a considerable amount of ransacking

done in the upstairs of the house, that was not the case with the
shelf area in the basement from which the green and black
footlockers were taken.

The other boxes and suitcases on those

shelves did not appear to have been disturbed, suggesting that
whoever took the two footlockers knew what they were after.
76)

(T.

The defendant knew that Lee Thompson was a coin collector,

and had personally helped move the footlockers and the filing
10

cabinet in the past, and had personally placed two guns under the
bed from which they were stolen.
7.

(T. 27-28, 52-53)

There was testimony that it would probably have

taken two people to move the one footlocker.

(T. 59-60)

Not

surprisingly, when the defendant left the state, he happened to
take a friend with him - the same friend who was still with him
four days later with much of the stolen property in his
possession.
8.

Finally, the defendant's financial situation was

highly suspect.

When he and Dobson left Utah, they had little

money between them, and this was apparently all Dobson's money.
(T. 152)

When arrested four days later, however, the defendant

miraculously had in excess of $900.00.

Dobson testified as a

defense witness that the defendant made $1,000.00 by acquiring,
mixing, and selling "coke" as soon as they arrived in Spokane,
Washington.

(T. 152)

The jury could possibly have believed that

story, or they could have accepted a more rational explanation
that was more consistent with the evidence - that the $900.00 was
obtained from selling or pawning old coin collections, a VCR,
guns, and other items at various locations.
In short, the evidence supporting the jury verdict that
the defendant exercized unauthorized control over property
belonging to Lee and Norma Thompson valued at greater than
$1,000.00, and that the defendant did so in Utah, is abundant.
The defendant contends that the jury's finding of not
guilty on the burglary count somehow undermines their finding of
guilt on the theft charge having occurred in Utah.
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This is not

true.

In order to prove the burglary charge, the State had to

prove, among other things, that the defendant entered a dwelling
unlawfully (Instruction 9, R. 37). The jury was further
instructed that an entry is unlawful when the premises "are not
open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed
or privileged to enter or remain on the premise..."

(Instruction

10, R. 38)
There was testimony in the present case that the
defendant had at one time lived with the Thompsons in the house
from which the property was taken (T. 28, 63), and that within a
few days prior, had gone to that house with permission to pick up
the mail, get firewood, etc.

Furthermore, Lee Thompson testified

that, while he had not given the defendant permission to enter
the house on this occasion, he had not specifically told the
defendant not to enter the home.

(T. 55-57)

A son-in-law might

well believe he had permission to enter his father-in-law's house
without being given specific permission.
Thus, the jury could very well have been convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the house in
West Point and stole the items, and at the same time the jury
could have harbored reasonable doubts about whether the
defendant's entry into the home was itself unlawful.

The

acquittal on the burglary charge is in no way inconsistent with
the finding that the defendant committed the theft in Utah.
The jury was properly instructed as to each element
necessary to find the defendant guilty of theft, and the jury was
required to find that the offense occurred in Davis County, Utah
12

in order to convict the defendant.
33, 40)

(Instructions 4 and 12, R.

Reasonable minds could easily be convinced, from the

evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
guilty of theft as charged.

The jury's verdict should be upheld.

POINT II. A.
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE GIVING OF
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14, AND CANNOT RAISE THE
ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
The record shows that counsel for the defense read each
of the jury instructions, and had no objections to any of the
instructions.

(T. 163)

Nor were any alternative instructions

proposed by the defense.
Having failed to state objections to any instructions at
the trial level, the defendant cannot now raise an objection to
instruction 14 for the first time on appeal.

Rule 19(c) of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
The giving of Instruction 14 cannot be said to have
created a "manifest injustice,9* and there is no necessity of
assigning error on appeal.

Unlike the improper jury instruction

given in State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
Instruction 14 was couched as a permissive inference, and not as
a mandatory rebuttable presumption.

Instruction 14 not only

failed to cause a manifest injustice, it caused no injustice at
13

all# as discussed below.

The issue simply cannot be raised at

this late date.
POINT II. B.
THE JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING POSSESSION OF
RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY IS A CORRECT
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
SOUND.
There is no question that due process requires the
State, in a criminal case, to prove each factual element of a
charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970).

It is equally

clear that a jury instruction which creates an irrebuttable
presumption, or a presumption so strong that only a high level of
proof can rebut it, causes an unconstitutional shift in the
burden of proof.

Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S.

Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L. Ed.2d 39 (1979).

And even a mandatory

rebuttable presumption (i.e., one which instructs the jury that
they must find a presumed fact if the state has proven particular
predicate facts) suffers from the same defect, again shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant.

Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S.

307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed.2d 344 (1985).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d
321 (1985) and State v. Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192 (1985), and this
Court in State v. Turner, supra. have embraced the Francis
holding and applied it to the mandatory rebuttable presumption
created by use of the statutory language in Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-6-402(1) (1953, as amended) in jury instructions.
However, the language used in Instruction 14 is couched
in permissive, not mandatory terms, and avoids the
14

unconstitutional shift of the burden of proof caused by the
mandatory language struck down in the cases cited above.
Jury Instruction 14 provided:
Possession of property recently stolen, if
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonably
draw the inference and find, in light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the
evidence in the case, that the person in
possession stole the property. Thus, if you
find from the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was
in possession of property, (2) that the
property was stolen, (3) that such possession
was not too remote in point of time from the
theft, and (4) that no satisfactory
explanation of such possession has been given
or appears from the evidence, then you may
infer from those facts and find that the
defendant stole the property. (R. 42)
The language, "you may reasonably draw the inference"
and "you may infer" is clearly permissive.

It puts no

requirements on what findings the jury must make, unlike the
"shall be deemed prima facie evidence" language of Chambers,
Pacheco, and Turner above.
Even in Sandstrom, supra, the United States Supreme
Court made it clear that permissive inferences are still
constitutionally proper.

In his opinion for the unanimous Court,

Justice Brennan implied that if the jury had been "told that they
had a choice or that they might infer that conclusion"
(Sandstrom, 442 U.S.

at 515, emphasis added), then no reasonable

juror could have viewed the instruction as mandatory.
Rehnguist in his concurring opinion added:
And surely if this charge had, in the words
of the Court, "merely described a permissive
inference," ante at 514, it could not
conceivably run afoul of the constitutional
15

Justice

decisions cited by the Court in its opinion.
Id. at 527.
In State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that MSandstrom does not apply in this
case where the jury was instructed that it could infer intent
from defendants actions.

A distinction is made in Sandstrom

between inferences and presumptions.11
original emphasis.

Eagle, 611 P.2d at 1214,

The instruction in Eagle read as follows:

A person's state of mind is not always
susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or
circumstances.
This Court ruled that this instruction was an accurate statement
of the law in this state.

See State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800

(Utah 1979); State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 (Utah 1969);
State v. Whittinghill, 163 P.2d 342 (Utah 1945).
Furthermore, almost identical language as that in
Instruction 14 has specifically been held to be proper and not to
violate any constitutional rights.

In Barnes v. U.S., 412 U.S.

837, 839, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed.2d 380, 384 (1973), the jury
was instructed that
possession of recently stolen property, if
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonably
draw the inference and find, in the light of
the surrounding circumstances shown by the
evidence in the case, that the person in
possession knew the property had been
stolen.
The United States Supreme Court first noted that the
instruction concerns H a traditional common-law inference deeply
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rooted in our law,11 and that "courts .... on numerous occasions
have approved instructions essentially identical to the
instruction given in this case.

This longstanding and consistent

judicial approval of the instruction, reflecting accumulated
common experience, provides strong indication that the
instruction comports with due process.11 412 U.S., at 843-4.

The

court then held that, even in the light of "present day
experience," the instruction satisfies due process standards.
The Supreme Court further held that the instruction did
not infringe on the defendants privilege against selfincrimination.

Id., at 846.

See also Turner v. U.S., 396 U.S.

398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed.2d 610 (1970);
Yee Hem v. U.S.. 268 U.S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. Ed. 904
(1925); and Chambers, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court
rejects the same 5th Amendment argument, citing 88 A.L.R.3d 1178
(1978) .
The Utah Supreme Court six months after deciding
Chambers and Pacheco, in State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (1986),
quoted the jury instruction given in Barnes (quoted above) with
approval, stating:
The Court held, "For centuries courts have
instructed juries that an inference of guilty
knowledge may be drawn from the fact of
unexplained possession of stolen goods." 412
U.S. at 843, 93 S. Ct. at 2362.
We have accepted approvingly the inference
as a factor in proving guilt in such cases as
State v. Sessions. Utah, 583 P.2d 44 (1978),
State v. Kirkham. 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638
(1967), and State v. Merritt. 67 Utah 325,
247 P. 497 (1926).
717 P.2d at 718.
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It is clear that both the United States Supreme Court
and the Utah Supreme Court do not approve of mandatory
presumptions (rebuttable or irrebuttable); it is equally clear
that both courts do constitutionally approve the use of
permissive presumptions, and both courts specifically approve of
the language used in Instruction 14. Since Instruction 14 was
properly couched as a permissive inference, the defendant was not
denied due process of law.

Finally, even if the instruction had

been given in error, because of the strength of the evidence of
guilt in addition to the mere possession of the stolen property,
it would be harmless error.
Conclusion
The evidence supports the jury verdict finding the
defendant guilty of a felony theft committed within the State of
Utah.

Jury Instruction 14 was a proper, constitutionally

acceptable instruction for the jury, and the defendant is not
entitled to raise that issue on appeal since he did not object to
the instruction in the trial court.

The defendant is not

entitled to the relief he seeks on appeal, and his conviction
should be confirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this P&&

day of March, 1988.

J^/MARK ANDRUS
Deputy County Attorney
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ADDENDUM

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

20

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-201 (1953, as amended)
(1)

A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an

offense which he commits, while either within or outside the
state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is
legally accountable, if:
(a)

The offense is committed either wholly or partly within

the state; or
(b)

The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to

commit an offense within the state; or
(c)

The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy

to commit an offense within the state and an act in furtherance
of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or
(d)

The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt,

solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an
offense under the laws of both this state and such other
jurisdiction.
(2)

An offense is committed partly within this state if either

the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result
which is such an element, occurs within this state.

In homicide

the "result11 is either the physical contact which causes death, or
the death itself; and if the body of a homicide victim is found
within the state, the death shall be presumed to have occurred
within the state.
(3)

An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty

imposed by the law of this state is committed within the state
regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the
omission.
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Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-202 (1953, as amended)
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2)

Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was

committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the
second degree.

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-402(1)(1953, as amended)
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1)

Possession of property recently stolen, when no

satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be
deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole
the property.

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404 (1953, as amended)
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-19(9-c) (1953, as
amended)
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
request.

At the same time copies of such requests shall be
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furnished to the other parties.

The court shall inform counsel

of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or
otherwise waive this requirement.
(b)

Upon each written request so presented and given, or

refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial
or sign it.

If part be given and part refused, the court shall

distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge
was given and what part was refused.
(c)

No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or

omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the ground of his objection.

Norwithstanding a party's

failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order
to avoid a manifest injustice.
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